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We construct a model of FDI, risk and aid, where a country loses access to FDI
and aid if the country expropriates FDI. We show that: (i) The threat of expropri-
ation leads to under-investment; (ii) The optimal level of FDI decreases as the risk
of expropriation rises; and (iii) Under certain conditions, aid mitigates the adverse
e⁄ect of expropriation risk on FDI. The empirical analysis employs data for 35 low-
income countries and 28 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, over the period 1983-2004.
We ￿nd that risk has a negative e⁄ect on FDI, aid mitigates the adverse e⁄ect of risk
on FDI, and that bilateral and multilateral aid are roughly equivalent at achieving
these results. We also provide an estimate of the level of aid that would eliminate
expropriation risk, and ￿nd that for low-income countries, the amount of aid would
need to at least double in order for aid to completely o⁄set the e⁄ect of risk.
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When a multinational corporation (MNC) sets up a subsidiary abroad, the MNC faces
the risk that its investments may be expropriated by the host country or at least be
subject to unpredictable changes in rules and regulations.1 One of the reasons for the
existence of these types of risk is that there is no supranational entity that enforces con-
tracts across borders. In addition, the sovereignty status of countries limits the extent to
which governments can be ￿punished￿for violations of contractual agreements. Although
acts of complete expropriation of foreign capital are now rare (Kobrin, 1984; Minor, 1994),
changes in laws, regulations and contractual agreements (which we consider as partial ex-
propriation) are quite pervasive, especially in developing countries.2 For example, about
60 percent of the ￿rms that participated in the World Business Economic Survey reported
that they often had to deal with ￿unpredictable changes in rules and regulations￿which
a⁄ected their business.3 A recent example of a breach of contract between governments
and foreign-owned ￿rms is the case of Venezuela. In the early 1990s, Venezuela liberal-
ized its oil industry and signed service agreements with 22 foreign oil companies. Under
these contracts, foreign companies managed the oil ￿elds, and Petr￿leos de Venezuela S.A.
(PDVSA), a state-owned ￿rm, purchased the produced oil from the foreign ￿rms at the
market rate. However, in February 2006, the government signed a decree that beginning
May 2006, PDVSA will have at least 60 percent ownership in the oil production projects
managed by foreign oil ￿rms.4 The government also retroactively raised corporate income
tax on foreign oil companies from 30 percent to 50 percent and increased royalties from
1See Kobrin (1980), Makhija (1993) and Li (2005) for a detailed discussion about what motivates
governments to expropriate FDI.
2Kobrin (1984) and Minor (1994) document the number of nationalizations of foreign enterprises in
developing countries. Kobrin (1984) covers the period 1960-1979 and Minor (1994) covers 1980-1992. Both
studies show that the nationalization of foreign enterprises has declined over time.
3The survey was conducted by the World Bank in 1999/2000 and it covered 10,000 ￿rms in 81 countries.
See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/ for more information.
4Twenty six foreign oil companies agreed to convert their operations into joint ventures with PDVSA,
with PDVSA holding majority shares. Two European ￿rms (Total of France and Eni S.p.A of Italy) refused
to operate as a joint venture and hence were expelled. See the April 23, 2006 issue of the Washington
Post for more information. Also see Makhija (1993) for a discussion of expropriation incidents in the oil
industry by the Venezuelan government in the 1970s and 1980s.
1as low as one percent to 33 percent. Interestingly, the government of Bolivia adopted a
similar policy in April 2006.
Clearly, country risk that stems from government actions such as a breach of contrac-
tual agreements, changes in laws and regulations or the outright nationalization of foreign-
owned property has an adverse e⁄ect on foreign investment. In addition, these types of
risk have a more profound e⁄ect on foreign direct investment (FDI) than other types of
private foreign investment (e.g., portfolio investment). One reason is that FDI is partially
irreversible ￿ much of the costs associated with FDI are sunk and therefore cannot be
recouped if disinvestment occurs. Indeed, one of the reasons why many poor countries,
in particular, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have received very little FDI is that
the region is perceived as risky. The lack of FDI in poor countries is troubling because
FDI o⁄ers many potential advantages to host countries: it is a source of capital, creates
employment, boosts wages, enhances the productivity of domestic ￿rms and workers, and
promotes economic growth.5 Many international development agencies, in particular, the
World Bank, consider FDI as one of the e⁄ective tools in the global ￿ght against poverty.
For example, the key function of the World Bank￿ s Multilateral Investment Guarantees
Agency (MIGA) is to facilitate FDI to poor countries by mitigating investor risk. MIGA
provides insurance against expropriation, breach of contract, currency transfer restrictions
and political risk.6 MIGA also provides dispute resolution services to foreign investors and
member countries. Furthermore, MIGA o⁄ers loan guarantees to foreign investors (which
may help reduce risk-capital ratings of projects and thereby lower borrowing costs) and
it provides technical assistance for MIGA guaranteed projects. The role of MIGA as a
foreign investment risk mitigator is described in these very terms at the agency￿ s website:
MIGA gives private (foreign direct) investors the con￿dence and comfort
they need to make sustainable investments in developing countries. We act as
5The conclusions from empirical studies on the e⁄ect of FDI on host countries economy are far from
unanimous. Some ￿nd that FDI does not have a signifcant e⁄ect, whilst others conclude that the positive
e⁄ect of FDI will be realized only if certain conditions are met. See Carkovic and Levine (2005) for a
review of the literature.
6In ￿scal year 2007, MIGA issued about $1.4 billion in investment guarantees (insurance) in developing
countries. About 48 percent of the projects were in low-income countries and about 38 percent were in
Africa.
2a potent deterrent against government actions that may adversely a⁄ect invest-
ments. And even if disputes do arise, our leverage with host governments fre-
quently enables us to resolve di⁄erences to the mutual satisfaction of all parties.
MIGA￿ s relationship with shareholder governments provides additional leverage
in protecting investments, by deterring harmful actions by governments. Help-
ing investors overcome their concerns about potential political risks is precisely
why MIGA exists.
MIGA also notes at its website that ￿harmful actions by governments￿include the ex-
propriation of property and changes in contractual agreements. Thus, to the extent that
the services provided by MIGA can be characterized as foreign aid, the pronouncements by
MIGA suggest that multilateral aid, speci￿cally deters expropriation acts by governments,
and in general, reduces the risk faced by foreign direct investors.7 With regard to bilateral
aid, Kimura and Todo (2007) assert that aid serves as a quasi government guarantee for
investments in the recipient country that originate from the donor country. As a conse-
quence, aid reduces the level of risk perceived by MNCs from the donor country. Harms
and Rauber (2006) also ￿nd that both bilateral and multilateral aid improves a country￿ s
credit ratings and thereby reduces the level of risk perceived by foreign investors.
This paper examines the link between FDI, aid and expropriation risk. In a seminal
paper, Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) showed that the threat of expropriation has a negative
e⁄ect on FDI. We extend their analysis to determine whether foreign aid can ameliorate
this adverse e⁄ect. Speci￿cally, we construct a model of FDI, risk and aid, where a country
loses access to FDI and aid if the country expropriates FDI. We derive three main results:
(i) The threat of expropriation leads to under-investment; (ii) The optimal level of FDI
decreases as the risk of expropriation rises; and (iii) Under certain conditions, aid mitigates
the adverse e⁄ect of expropriation risk on FDI. For the empirical analysis, we consider a
panel of two country groups. The ￿rst group comprises of 35 low-income countries and
the second group consists of 28 countries in SSA.8 We consider three measures of aid:
7The relationship between default risk and aid has already been established in the empirical literature
on sovereign lending. For example, Nunnekamp and Picht (1989) conclude that countries that received
more subsidized loans were less likely to engage in willful default.
8We exclude middle-income countries (MINCs) from our regressions for three reasons. First, most
MINCs have little di¢ culty attracting FDI and therefore our analysis is less pertinent for MINCs. Second,
3bilateral, multilateral and aggregate aid, and our analysis covers the period 1983-2004.
We run separate regressions for bilateral and multilateral aid because according to the aid
literature, the two types of aid are driven by di⁄erent factors, suggesting that the e⁄ect of
aid on FDI may be di⁄erent for bilateral and multilateral aid (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984).
We answer three questions: (i) Does expropriation risk have an adverse e⁄ect on FDI?; (ii)
Can aid ameliorate the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI?; (iii) Can aid completely neutralize
the negative e⁄ect of risk on FDI? These questions have important policy implications. For
example, if aid can completely overcome the adverse e⁄ect of risk, then one may advocate
for an increase in aid to developing countries.
As a benchmark, we estimate a reduced form FDI equation. Here, we employ two
estimation procedures ￿ the dynamic panel ￿di⁄erence￿ General Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the ￿system￿ GMM es-
timator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). We ￿nd that risk has a negative and
signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI, aid mitigates the adverse e⁄ect of risk, and that bilateral and
multilateral aid are roughly equivalent at achieving these results. We also provide an
estimate of the level of aid that would eliminate the negative e⁄ect of expropriation risk,
and ￿nd that for low-income countries, the amount of aid would need to at least double
in order for aid to completely o⁄set the e⁄ect of risk. These results hold for both sample
groups, the three measures of aid as well as the two estimation procedures. We next take
into account the possibility that FDI and aid are jointly determined. Here, we extend
the theoretical model to consider the case where aid and FDI are jointly determined and
estimate by three-stage least squares (3SLS) the structural equations that determine FDI
and aid. We ￿nd that the results for the 3SLS regressions are qualitatively similar to
the GMM estimation results. We also ￿nd that the risk-mitigating e⁄ect of aid is more
MINCs score low on the measure of expropriation risk, suggesting that expropriation is less of a concern for
MINCs. The third reason for excluding MINCs is that the factors that drive FDI to low-income countries
are likely to be di⁄erent from the factors that determine FDI to MINCs (Blonigen and Wang, 2005). In
addition, the e⁄ect of aid on FDI are likely to be di⁄erent for the two income groups (Asiedu and Nandwa,
2007). As a consequence, including MINCs in the study would entail carrying out a separate analysis for
MINCs, since any analysis based on a pooled sample will be biased. This will make the paper less focused.
We therefore focus on countries that are high risk and have trouble attracting FDI.
4pronounced for the 3SLS regressions than the GMM regressions.
This paper is related to two strands of the empirical literature. The ￿rst analyzes the
e⁄ect of country risk on FDI (e.g., Loree and Guisinger, 1995). The consensus is that risk
has a negative e⁄ect on FDI. The second strand of the literature examines whether aid
has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI. The results are con￿ icting.9 Note that the ￿rst strand of
studies focus on the direct e⁄ect of risk on FDI ￿ i.e., interested in the sign and signi￿cance
of @FDI=@Risk, and the second strand of studies focus on the e⁄ect of aid on FDI ￿
i.e., interested in @FDI=@Aid. We take a di⁄erent approach in that we are interested in
analyzing whether aid can ameliorate the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI, i.e., whether aid
reduces @FDI=@Risk. Speci￿cally, in answering question (i), we focus on @FDI=@Risk
and for question (ii) we are interested in the sign and signi￿cance of @
@Aid (@FDI=@Risk).
We end this section by providing a rationale for running separate regressions for coun-
tries in SSA. Indeed, one may argue that such an analysis is unnecessary because there
is an overlap between low-income countries and countries in SSA. However, we focus on
SSA for the following ￿ve reasons. First, FDI and aid are crucial for poverty reduction
in SSA.10 Second, aid to SSA has increased substantially since 2002. The average aid per
capita increased from about $20:82 over the period 1998-2001 to about $35:07 over the pe-
riod 2002-2005, an increase of more than 68 percent. This trend is expected to continue in
the near future.11 It is therefore important to analyze the e⁄ectiveness of aid to the region.
The third reason is that SSA has an ￿image￿problem: the region is perceived as very risky.
For example, about 56 percent of the ￿rms that participated in a survey conducted by
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that the
9For example, Chauvet and MesplØ-Somps (2006), Yasin (2005) and Rodrik (1995) analyze whether aid
has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI in SSA. Yasin (2005) ￿nds that bilateral aid has an adverse e⁄ect on FDI
and multilateral aid does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect. Rodrik ￿nds that bilateral aid enhances FDI ￿ ows
but multilateral aid has a negative e⁄ect on FDI. Chauvet and MesplØ-Somps (2006) on the other hand
￿nd no relationship between FDI and three measures of aid ￿ bilateral, multilateral and aggregate aid.
10This point in noted in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which states that ￿...We [the
United Nations General Assembly] resolve to take special measures to address the challenges of poverty
eradication and sustainable development in Africa, including debt cancellation, improved market ac-
cess, enhanced O¢ cial Development Assistance (i.e., foreign aid) and increased ￿ows of Foreign Direct
Investment...￿(United Nations (2000), pp. 5)
11For example, in 2005 the G8 pledged to raise annual development aid to SSA by $25 billion by 2010
￿ which is more than double the levels in 2004.
5actual business environment in SSA was better than the continent￿ s image would suggest
(UNCTAD, 2000).12 Thus to the extent that risk deters FDI and that FDI is crucial for
poverty alleviation, analyzing whether aid can mitigate the adverse e⁄ect of risk has im-
portant policy implications. Another reason for focusing on SSA is that the determinants
of FDI to SSA may be di⁄erent from the determinants of FDI to other regions (Asiedu,
2002). Also the aid-growth literature suggests that aid may be less e⁄ective in countries
that are located in the tropics (Dalgaard et. al., 2004). About 92 percent of SSA￿ s ter-
ritories lie within the tropics (compared with about 3 percent for OECD, 8 percent for
North Africa and 60 percent for East Asia), suggesting that the e⁄ects of foreign aid in
SSA may be di⁄erent from that in other regions. If the factors that drive FDI to SSA are
di⁄erent from the factors that determine FDI to other regions, or the e⁄ect of aid on FDI
varies systematically across SSA and non-SSA countries, then estimations that employ a
pooled sample of SSA and non-SSA countries will produce misleading results. Finally,
there is a widespread notion among policymakers in the region that the conclusions based
on studies of countries outside SSA are not applicable to SSA because countries in the
African region are so di⁄erent. Therefore, the ￿ndings from studies that are based solely
on SSA will have more credibility with policymakers in the region.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, Section 3
describes the data and the variables, Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section
5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of FDI, Risk and Aid
The synopsis of the model is as follows. The economy consists of two agents: a poor host
country and a foreign ￿rm. The ￿rm engages in FDI by setting up a subsidiary in the
poor country and the country receives a fraction of the output from the FDI project. In
addition, the poor country receives aid from abroad. Each period, the country may choose
to expropriate foreign capital by taking the entire FDI output. If expropriation occurs,
12This view is also consistent with the empirical results of Haque et. al. (2000) who ￿nd that commercial
risk-rating agencies often rate African countries as riskier than warranted by the fundamentals.
6the country loses access to aid and FDI in future periods.13 Thus, the threat of losing
FDI and aid deters countries from expropriating FDI.
The Model
Consider a world with an in￿nite time horizon and two agents: a foreign ￿rm and a
poor host country. The ￿rm operates a project in the host country. It rents capital at
a unit cost of r: Let f(.) denote output per capita, which satis￿es the Inada conditions.
Each period the ￿rm chooses the amount of capital to invest in the FDI project. Let kt
denote the amount of capital per capita invested in period t. At the end of the period,
the output is shared by the ￿rm and the host country: the host country gets ￿f(kt), and
the remaining output, (1 ￿ ￿)f(kt), goes to the ￿rm, where ￿ 2 (0;1).14 The share, ￿,
is chosen by the host country and is known to the ￿rm before the ￿rm makes investment
decisions. The host country receives aid from abroad. Let A be the amount of units of
output received in the form of aid. Following Asiedu and Villamil (2002), we assume that
the income from FDI and aid are consumed in the current period. The main friction is that
in each period the host country may choose to expropriate FDI. If expropriation occurs,
the entire FDI output accrues to the country and the country retains the aid, however,
the country losses access to FDI and aid in future periods.15 Note that the environment
we consider is stationary. Hence, for a given level of aid, the same equilibrium allocation
applies for every period.
For the purpose of exposition, we consider two cases. In Case 1, we consider an
environment where there is no risk of expropriation. Here, we derive the unconstrained
13Our model builds on Asiedu and Villamil (2002) where the authors analyzed how foreign aid and
default risk a⁄ect sovereign lending. In their model, a country borrows from abroad and also receives aid.
If the country defaults on a loan agreement, it receives no more aid or private loans in future. They ￿nd
that the threat of a default has a negative e⁄ect on sovereign lending and that aid reduces the likelihood
that a country will default. An important di⁄erence between our work and Asiedu and Villamil (2002) is
that they focus on default risk and indirect foreign investment (includes sovereign lending and portfolio
investment), while we focus on expropriation risk and FDI. As pointed out earlier, the risk of expropriation
pertains more to FDI than indirect foreign investment.
14We note that ￿ may be interpreted as a tax on output. However, interpreting ￿ as the share of output
that accrues to the host country facilitates the presentation of our model.
15This trigger strategy punishment is standard in the literature. See Kletzer (1994) and Eaton and
Fernandez (1995) for discussions of various penalties. Also, similar to Eaton and Gersovitz (1984), we do
not consider the case of partial expropriation.
7optimal investment plan. In Case 2, FDI is subject to expropriation risk. We solve for
the constrained optimal plan, and analyze how aid and risk a⁄ect the optimal level of
investment.
Case 1: No Expropriation Risk.
We start with the foreign ￿rm￿ s problem. For a given share, ￿, the ￿rm chooses k to
maximize its pro￿t, which is given by
￿ (k;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)f (k) ￿ rk:
Thus, the optimal k satis￿es
(1 ￿ ￿)f0 (k) = r: (1)
Clearly the optimal k is a function of ￿; denoted by k(￿):
We now turn to the host country￿ s problem. Let ￿ be the host country￿ s discount factor
and assume that the country has a risk neutral utility.16 Then the present discounted




￿t [￿tf (kt) + At] =
1
1 ￿ ￿
[￿f(k) + A]: (2)
Taking into account the ￿rm￿ s optimal investment decision, k(￿), the host country chooses








Let (ku;￿u) be the unconstrained optimal plan ￿ i.e., when expropriation risk is ab-
sent. Then (ku;￿u) is determined by the pro￿t maximizing condition (1) and the utility
maximizing condition (3):
Case 2: Environment with Expropriation Risk.
The host country can successfully attract FDI only if it can assure the ￿rm that it will
not expropriate. A constraint (which we refer to as an expropriation constraint) has to be
16We focus on risk neutrality to study the e⁄ect of ￿pure expropriation￿ on investment. Asiedu and
Villamil (2002) and Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) make a similar assumption.
8satis￿ed, whereby the discounted payo⁄ from not expropriating is greater than or equal
to the discounted payo⁄ from expropriating.





which is the same as Y (k(￿);￿) in Case 1. If expropriation occurs, the country keeps the
total output and aid, and receives no FDI and aid in future periods. Hence, the country￿ s
discounted income if expropriation occurs, denoted by Y E, is given by:
Y E(k(￿)) = f (k(￿)) + A:
Clearly, the country will not expropriate if Y NE(:) ￿ Y E(:), and thus the expropriation
constraint can be written as
Y NE(k(￿);￿) ￿ Y E(k(￿)): (4)
Therefore, taking the ￿rm￿ s optimal investment decision, k(￿); as given, the host
country chooses ￿ to maximize its present discounted utility of income, Y NE (k(￿);￿);
subject to the expropriation constraint, (4). Clearly ￿ is determined by the binding
expropriation constraint, Y E(k(￿)) = Y NE(k(￿);￿); i.e.,17
f (k(￿)) + A =
1
1 ￿ ￿
[￿f(k(￿)) + A]: (5)
Let (kc;￿c) be the constrained optimal plan. Then (kc;￿c) is determined by the pro￿t
maximizing condition (1) and the binding expropriation constraint (5).
Measuring Risk
In order to derive our main results, we need to quantify risk. Recall that in the absence
of risk, the optimal investment plan is given by the unconstrained optimal allocation,
(ku;￿u). If this plan satis￿es the expropriation constraint, then risk is zero. However, if
this plan violates the expropriation constraint, then Y E (ku;￿u) > Y NE (ku;￿u); and risk
17The situation where the expropriation constraint is not binding is not interesting because the solution
is the same as in Case 1, i.e., no expropriation risk.
9exists. We therefore use the di⁄erence between Y E (ku;￿u) and Y NE (ku;￿u) as a measure
of risk. Speci￿cally, for a given level of aid, A, we de￿ne the level of expropriation risk,
R(A); in units of income, as
R(A) = Y E(ku) ￿ Y NE(ku;￿u): (6)
We now state our main results. The proofs are in Appendix A.
Result (i): The threat of expropriation leads to under-investment: the optimal level
of investment is constrained, i.e., kc < ku;
Result (ii): The risk of expropriation has an adverse e⁄ect on FDI ￿ i.e., dkc
dR < 0;
Result (iii): Under certain conditions, aid mitigates the adverse e⁄ect of expropriation






3 The Data and the Variables
Our data set consists of two sample groups: 28 countries in SSA and 35 low-income
countries (9 non-SSA countries and 26 SSA countries), and the data cover the period 1983-
2004. The years of coverage and the countries included are determined by the availability
of data. Speci￿cally, the data on risk are not available for several countries. Table 1
displays the list of countries.
Country Risk
In order to test the implications of the model, we need data on country risk that
measure the likelihood that a country will renege on contractual obligations. To the best of
our knowledge such data are not readily available. Thus, to capture expropriation/default
risk, we employ data on investor risk from the International Country Risk Guide database,
published by The Political Risk Services (PRS).18 The PRS rating is a composite measure
derived from the sum of three risk components that a⁄ect FDI: (i) The risk of unilateral
contract modi￿cation or cancellation and, at worst, outright expropriation of foreign owned
18For more information about the data, see http://www.prsgroup.com/.
10assets; (ii) restrictions on pro￿t repatriation; and (iii) payment delays by government. The
score of each component ranges from 0-4, where a higher number implies less risk. Thus
the PRS risk variable ranges from 0-12. To facilitate the interpretation of the results,
we rescaled the data by subtracting the original score from 12, so that a higher number
implies more risk. Table 1 shows the risk ratings for the countries in our sample averaged
over the period 1983-2004.
We point out three caveats of the PRS risk variable. First, note that the aspect of
the composite risk variable that is most relevant for our analysis is component (i), which
measures the risk of expropriation. Unfortunately, the data on expropriation risk alone
are not available prior to March 2001. The short series makes panel estimations infeasible.
As a consequence we use the composite risk as a proxy for expropriation/default risk. We
argue that the PRS measure of risk, although imperfect, is still appropriate for our analysis
because it re￿ ects the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation by host country
governments. The second caveat is that risk assessments by private rating agencies, such
as PRS, do not accurately re￿ ect the risk levels in developing countries. Speci￿cally, the
ratings tend to be biased against poor countries or smaller countries. One reason is that
private agencies under-invest in collecting and processing information about poor countries
(Ferri, 2004). The third drawback of the PRS risk variable is that the ratings are based
on the opinions of experts, and hence, are based on perceptions. Perceptions are ￿noisy￿
in that they are in￿ uenced by the biases of the experts about a particular country. An
option is to use an ￿objective￿measure of expropriation risk.19 However, to the best of our
knowledge, such a measure does not exist. We acknowledge that these limitations make
our measure of risk susceptible to measurement errors, which may cause our estimates to
be biased. However, we argue that in spite of these caveats, our analysis provides some
insight about the e⁄ect of risk and aid on FDI ￿ ows to poor countries ￿ i.e., the countries
in most dire need of FDI.
Foreign Aid
19See Asiedu and Freeman (2007) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2007) for a discussion of the advantages
and limitations of subjective and objective measures of risk and other governance indicators.
11The data on aid are from the OECD￿ s International Development Statistics. Aid may
be broadly classi￿ed as bilateral or multilateral. Bilateral aid refers to aid from one coun-
try (i.e., donor country) to another (i.e., recipient country). Projects or activities executed
by multilateral institutions (e.g., the World Bank) or non-governmental organizations on
behalf of a donor country are also classi￿ed as bilateral aid, since the use of the funds
is controlled by the donor country. Multilateral aid refers to projects ￿nanced from the
regular budgets of multilateral institutions. Thus the classi￿cation of aid hinges on ￿who￿
controls the funds or project. We de￿ne aggregate aid as the sum of bilateral and multi-
lateral aid. Table 1 shows the data for aid averaged over the period 1983-2004. Overall,
bilateral aid is much higher than multilateral aid ￿ bilateral aid constitutes about 65
percent of aggregate aid for the countries in our sample.
Other Variables
As is standard in the literature, the dependent variable is the ratio of net FDI ￿ ows to
GDP. Our control variables are drawn from the empirical literature on the determinants
of FDI. Speci￿cally, we include (exports+imports)/GDP as a measure of trade openness;
the number of telephones per 1000 population as a measure of infrastructure availability
and the level of development; and GDP growth rate to capture growth opportunities in
the host country. Several studies have found that FDI ￿ ows are persistent and that lagged
FDI are positively related to current FDI (e.g., Karakaplan et. al., 2006). Thus following
the literature, we include lagged FDI as an explanatory variable. As is standard in the
literature, we average the data over four years to smooth out cyclical ￿ uctuations. The
data are from the World Development Indicators (2005) published by the World Bank.
The descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 2.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Dynamic Panel Estimations
As pointed out in Section 3, several studies have found that lagged FDI ￿ ows tend to
in￿ uence current FDI ￿ ows. We therefore estimate a linear dynamic panel-data (DPD)
12model to capture the e⁄ect of lag FDI ￿ ows on current ￿ ows. DPD models contain unob-
served panel-level e⁄ects that are correlated with the lagged dependent variable, rendering
standard estimators inconsistent. The General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator pro-
posed by Arellano and Bond (1991) provides consistent estimates for such models. This
estimator often referred to as the ￿di⁄erence-GMM￿estimator uses lagged values of the
￿rst di⁄erence of the endogenous variables as instruments. However, as pointed out by
Arellano and Bover (1995), lagged levels are often poor instruments for ￿rst di⁄erences.
This problem is mitigated by using the augmented version of the di⁄erence-GMM esti-
mator, the ￿system-GMM￿estimator, proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which uses
additional moment conditions. However, the system-GMM utilizes more instruments and
therefore raises the concern that the estimates may be heavily biased (Hahn and Haus-
man, 2002). For robustness, we report the regressions for the two estimators. We also note
that the estimates from this procedure are inconsistent in the presence of autocorrelation.
Hence for each regression we test for autocorrelation and also check the validity of the
instruments. For all the regressions, our results con￿rm the absence of autocorrelation
and the validity of the instruments.
We estimate the reduced form equation:
FDIit = ￿Riskit + ￿Aidit + ￿Riskit ￿ Aidit + ￿FDIit￿1
+￿J
j=1￿jZjit + ￿i + "it (7)
where index i refers to countries, t to time, ￿i is the country-speci￿c e⁄ect, and Z is a vector
of control variables discussed in the previous section, and FDI and Aid are FDI=GDP
and Aid=GDP, respectively. We proceed by answering the three questions posed in the
introduction.
Question 1: Does Expropriation Risk have an Adverse E⁄ect on FDI?
To answer this question we estimate equation (7) without the interaction term, Risk￿
Aid. Thus we estimate the equation:
FDIit = ￿Riskit + ￿Aidit + ￿FDIit￿1 + ￿J
j=1￿jZjit + ￿i + "it:
13Here the parameter of interest is the estimated coe¢ cient of Risk, b ￿. Table 3 shows the
results for the di⁄erence-GMM estimations. Note that b ￿ is negative and signi￿cant at the
one percent level for all the three measures of aid and the two sample groups. For the
SSA sample, a one standard deviation (sd = 1:86) increase in Risk will decrease FDI by
about 0:640 percentage points for aggregate aid, 0:614 percentage points for bilateral aid
and about 0:55 percentage points for multilateral aid. We use an example to provide the
reader with a better sense of the harmful e⁄ect of risk. Consider two countries in SSA that
have extremely di⁄erent risk pro￿les ￿ Congo Dem. Republic, the riskiest country in the
region and Botswana, the country with the lowest risk ratings (see Table 1). Then for the
regressions using aggregate aid, a decrease in risk from the level of Congo (Risk = 9:25)
to the level of Botswana (Risk = 4:231) will increase FDI by about 1:727 percentage
points in the short run and by about 2:365 percentage points in the long-run.20 Note
that the increase in FDI is quite substantial because the average annual growth in FDI
for Congo over the period 1983-2004 is about 0:56 percent. As a robustness check we
examine the e⁄ect of risk on FDI using the system-GMM. To conserve on space, we do
not report the full regression results. We ￿nd that similar to the di⁄erence-GMM, b ￿ is
negative and signi￿cant at the one percent level in all the regressions. Speci￿cally, for
the low-income country (LINC) sample, b ￿ is equal to ￿0:266, ￿0:282 and ￿0:234, for
aggregate aid, bilateral aid and multilateral aid, respectively; and for the SSA sample, b ￿
is equal to ￿0:328, ￿0:321 and ￿0:287, for aggregate aid, bilateral aid and multilateral
aid, respectively.
We now turn our attention to the other explanatory variables. Table 3 shows that
aid has a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI. In explaining this result we draw from
Harms and Lutz (2006) who argue that the theoretical impact of aid on FDI is unclear.
On the one hand, aid may raise the productivity of private capital by ￿nancing public
20This follows from the fact that the short-run e⁄ect of a ￿ change in Risk on FDI is given by (b ￿￿￿)
and the long-run e⁄ect is (b ￿ ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ b ￿), where b ￿ is the estimated coe¢ cient of Risk and b ￿ is the
estimated coe¢ cient of FDIit￿1. Here, ￿ = (4:231 ￿ 9:25) and from Table 3, b ￿ = ￿0:344 and b ￿ = 0:270.
Then @FDI=@Risk = 1:727 = ￿0:344 ￿ (4:231 ￿ 9:25) in the short run and @FDI=@Risk = ￿2:365 =
￿0:344 ￿ (4:231 ￿ 9:25)=(1 ￿ 0:270) in the long run.
14infrastructure investments (Dollar and Easterly, 1999). However, aid could also create
incentives for rent-seeking activities (Svensson, 2000). Thus, a plausible explanation for
our results is that for the countries in our sample, the negative rent-seeking e⁄ect of aid
dominates the positive infrastructure e⁄ect. The estimated coe¢ cient of the lagged FDI is
signi￿cant, an indication that FDI is persistent. Finally, consistent with many empirical
studies on the determinants of FDI, we ￿nd that GDP growth, openness to trade and
infrastructure availability have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI.
Question 2: Can Aid Ameliorate the Adverse E⁄ect of Risk on FDI?
We now test the central hypothesis of the paper, i.e., whether increasing aid leads
to a signi￿cant reduction in @FDI=@Risk. Here, we estimate equation (7). Table 4
shows the results for the di⁄erence-GMM estimations. Note that @FDI=@Risk = b ￿ +
b ￿ ￿ Aid; and therefore the parameters of interest are the estimated coe¢ cient of Risk,
b ￿, and the estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term, b ￿. For the two sample groups
and for all the measures of aid, b ￿ is negative and signi￿cant at the one percent level,
and b ￿ is positive and signi￿cant at the one percent level, suggesting that aid signif-
icantly reduces the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI. Here again, we use an example to
elucidate our results. We consider two countries, Kenya and Gambia, both located in
the same region, SSA. Aggregate aid as a share of GDP averaged over the period 1983-
2004 is 7:22 percent for Kenya and 21:9 percent for Gambia (see Table 1). Suppose
the risk level in Kenya increases by one sample standard deviation (sd = 1:86, see
Table 2). Then, all else equal, the increase in Risk will decrease FDI by about 0:75
percentage points [@FDI=@Risk = (￿0:54 + 0:019 ￿ 7:22) ￿ 1:86 = ￿0:75]. Now suppose
the amount of aid to Kenya was increased to the level of aid to Gambia. Then, a one
standard deviation increase in Risk will decrease FDI by only 0:23 percentage points
[@FDI=@Risk = (￿0:54 + 0:019 ￿ 21:9) ￿ 1:86 = ￿0:23], which is about 69 percent less
than the expected decrease in FDI under the current level of aid.
We next examine whether our result holds when we employ the system-GMM estima-
tor. To conserve on space we report only the values of b ￿ and b ￿ in Table 5. The results are
15qualitatively similar to that of the di⁄erence-GMM: For the two sample groups and for
all the three measures of aid, b ￿ is negative and signi￿cant at the one percent level, and b ￿
is positive and signi￿cant at the one percent level. Thus, our estimations suggest that the
mitigating e⁄ect of foreign aid on risk is robust.
We end by pointing out an implication of our results which, at a glance seems puzzling.
Note that the marginal e⁄ect of aid on FDI is @FDI=@Aid = b ￿ + b ￿ ￿ Risk. Since b ￿ < 0
and b ￿ > 0, it follows that higher levels of risk improve the e⁄ect of aid on FDI. Indeed,
this result is similar to that of Harms and Lutz (2006) who ￿nd that aid is more e⁄ective
in promoting FDI in countries that have a large regulatory burden. Note however, that
this result does not imply that higher risk is good for FDI. As discussed above, the overall
e⁄ect of risk on FDI is negative and signi￿cant, suggesting that countries need to lower
their risk in order to attract FDI.
Question 3: Can Aid Completely Neutralize the Adverse E⁄ect of Risk on FDI?
Having ascertained that aid mitigates the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI, a natural
question that arises is this: can aid o⁄set the negative e⁄ect of risk? For our analysis,
we are interested in determining the level of aid that drives @FDI=@Risk to zero (i.e.,
b ￿ + b ￿ ￿ Aid = 0). We proceed by evaluating @FDI=@Risk at reasonable values of Aid.
Table 6 shows the value of Aid at the 25th percentile, 50th percentile and 75th percentile
for the two sample groups. Table 7 shows @FDI=@Risk evaluated at these three values
of Aid.
There are two notable points from Table 7. First, @FDI=@Risk decreases substan-
tially as aid increases. For example, the di⁄erence-GMM estimations show that increasing
aggregate aid from the 25th percentile to the 50th percentile will reduce @FDI=@Risk by
about 20 percent for the LINC sample, and about 25 percent for the SSA sample. The
second notable point is that @FDI=@Risk remains negative and signi￿cant even when Aid
is quite high, as high as the 75th percentile of Aid [for the LINC sample, this is equivalent
to about 16 percent of GDP (see Table 6)]. These results suggest that although increas-
ing aid reduces the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI, aid may not completely neutralize the
16negative e⁄ect of risk. To con￿rm this conjecture, we compare Aid￿ and Aid, where Aid￿
is the critical value of aid, de￿ned as the level of aid at which @FDI=@Risk = 0 and
Aid is the actual values of aid, averaged over the period 1983-2004. The results shown
in Table 8 suggest that completely eliminating risk, will require a substantial increase in
aid. For example, for the LINC sample, Aid￿ is about 32 percent for the di⁄erence-GMM
estimations and 57 percent for the system-GMM estimations. However, the average aid,
Aid, is a mere 12 percent. Thus Aid will have to increase by about 167 to about 375
percent in order to completely o⁄set the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI. Indeed, only one
country in the sample, Guinea-Bissau, has aid values close to the threshold, Aid￿. This
result is important because it suggests that although aid may mitigate the adverse e⁄ect
of risk on FDI, it cannot (realistically), neutralize the negative e⁄ect of risk.21
4.2 Joint Determination of FDI and Aid
The benchmark GMM estimations may be described as a ￿bare bones￿approach to an-
alyzing the role of aid in mitigating the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI. A major caveat,
however, is that the analysis does not include any determinants of aid. Furthermore, it is
possible that aid and FDI are determined jointly. On the one hand, a country￿ s ability to
attract FDI may in￿ uence donors￿decision to provide aid. On the other hand, an increase
in aid to a country (e.g., aid that results in increased privatizations or aid aimed at boost-
ing a country￿ s physical infrastructure) may a⁄ect FDI ￿ ows. It is also possible that the
factors that cause changes in FDI re￿ ect general conditions in the recipient country that
also a⁄ect aid allocation.
21We note that the di⁄erence-GMM results are roughly comparable between the low-income and SSA
groups, but the results for the two groups are quite di⁄erent for the system-GMM estimations. This
may be partly explained by the fact that the system-GMM estimator utilizes more instruments than the
di⁄erence-GMM estimator. In addition, the estimates from the system-GMM regressions are sensitive to
the sample size, particularly when the sample size is small relative to the number of instruments (Roodman,
2007). When the sample size is small, a small change in the sample size can generate large changes in the
estimated coe¢ cients. Note that in such a situation, one should focus on the qualitative di⁄erences (sign
and statistical signi￿cance) rather than the quantitative di⁄erences (i.e., the magnitude) of the estimated
coe¢ cients. The low-income country sample consists of 35 countries and the SSA sample consists of 28
samples. Thus, a plausible explanation for the di⁄erence in the estimated coe¢ cients is the reduction in
sample size, from 35 to 28.
17In this section, we extend the theoretical model to consider the case where aid and
FDI are jointly determined and perform a joint estimation of the structural equations that
determine FDI and aid. This approach has at least three advantages. First, the results of
the joint estimation serves as a robustness check for the estimates from the reduced form
equations reported in Section 4.1. Second, the approach provides explicit information
about the factors that in￿ uence aid allocation. Such an analysis is important for policy
formulation. Finally, although there is a vast empirical literature on the determinants of
aid, most of the papers do not estimate a model with micro-foundations. To keep the
paper focused, we discuss the empirical results here and show the theoretical model in
Appendix B. We also compare the results from the joint estimations with the benchmark
GMM estimations.
4.2.1 Estimation Results
As expected, donors pursue multiple objectives when providing aid. Aid may be motivated
by altruism, for example, reducing poverty in recipient countries. However, aid may also
be driven by strategic reasons, such as promoting the ideology or political interest of the
donor country. We note that aid to poor countries is likely to be largely motivated by
altruism. For example, The Commission for Africa recommended that the G8 should
consider ￿allocating aid to countries where poverty is deepest￿(2005, p.99). Our sample
comprises largely of low-income countries. Therefore in order to keep the paper focused,
we abstract from other determinants of aid and focus on the ￿recipient-need￿factors that
a⁄ect aid allocation.
We consider three altruistic motivations for providing aid ￿ the desire to help the
recipient country to: (i) raise the standard of living of its residents; (ii) meet its debt
obligations; and (iii) to restore internal balance. We use ln(GDP per capita) in constant
2000 dollars as a measure of poverty;22 the ratio of public debt to exports as a measure of
22Some studies have employed alternative measures of poverty, such as infant mortality and life ex-
pectancy (e.g., Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Behrman and Sah, 1984). We use income per capita for three
reasons. First, the data on infant mortality and life expectancy exhibit very little variation over time
within country. This is clearly problematic for a panel data analysis. The second reason is that the World
Bank uses income per capita as the eligibility criteria for countries to borrow from the Bank. Finally, we
18a countries ability to service its debt, and in￿ ation as a measure of macroeconomic insta-
bility.23 We also include the square of in￿ ation to test whether in￿ ation has a diminishing
e⁄ect on aid. Finally, we include the ln(Population) to test the ￿small country e⁄ect￿
which stipulates that countries with small populations receive more aid per capita than
larger countries.24 All the data are from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM,
published by the World Bank.
We estimate jointly the dynamic simultaneous equations model with two structural
equations by 3SLS:
FDI Equation:
FDIit = ￿Riskit + ￿Aidit + ￿Riskit ￿ Aidit￿1 + ￿FDIit￿1 (8)
+￿1Growthit + ￿2 ln(1 + Phones)it + ￿3Tradeit + "it
Aid Equation:25
Aidit = ￿FDIit + ￿1 ln(GDP per capita)it + ￿2Debtit (9)
+￿3Inflationit + ￿4(Inflationit)2 + ￿5 ln(Population)it + ￿it
The endogenous variables are Aidit and FDIit. There are two predetermined variables:
the lagged values of Aid, Aidit￿1, and the lagged values of FDI, FDIit￿1. The remaining
variables are exogenous, and "it and ￿it are error terms. Note that if Aidit is correlated
with "it, then the interaction term, Riskit￿Aidit, is also correlated with "it. To get around
the di¢ cult task of ￿nding appropriate instruments for Riskit ￿ Aidit, we interact Riskit
argue that income per capita is strongly correlated with most poverty indicators, and therefore income per
capita may be interpreted as a broad measure of poverty in recipient countries.
23We also experimented with other variables that have been employed in other studies, such as govern-
ment de￿cits, terms of trade, openness to trade, political instability and corruption. However, none of the
variables displayed a consistent and signi￿cant relationship with aid.
24There are several explanations for the small country e⁄ect. One explanation is that small countries
tend to be more open and therefore need more aid to ￿nance their imports. See Dudley and Montmarquette
(1976) and Chauvet and MesplØ-Somps (2006) for a detailed discussion about the small country e⁄ect and
foreign aid allocation.
25We considered speci￿cations where we included risk as an explanatory variable, but it was not signi￿-
cant.
19with the lagged value of Aid, and include Riskit ￿ Aidit￿1 in our regressions.26 The idea
is that Aidit￿1 is less likely to be correlated with "it (Greene, 2006). Thus, this innocuous
and simple strategy obviates us from the di¢ culty of ￿nding appropriate instruments,
permits us to address the main objective of the paper, and also keeps the paper focused.
Table 9 presents the regression results. Panel A shows the estimation results for the
FDI equation and panel B displays the results for the Aid equation. As shown in Panel A,
the results for the 3SLS regressions are qualitatively similar to the results from the GMM
estimations. Speci￿cally, the estimated coe¢ cient of Risk, b ￿, is negative and signi￿cant
at least at the 5 percent level for all the three measures of aid and the two sample groups.
In addition, the estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term, b ￿, is positive and signi￿cant
at the one percent level in all the regressions, suggesting that aid mitigates the adverse
e⁄ect of risk on FDI. Overall, the control variables performed quite well. The estimated
coe¢ cient of the measure of infrastructure, ln(1 + Phones), is not signi￿cant. However,
the other explanatory variables are signi￿cant at least at the 5 percent level and have the
correct signs.
We next examine the e⁄ectiveness of aid in reducing @FDI=@Risk by evaluating
@FDI=@Risk at reasonable values of Aid. Table 10 shows the values of Aid at the
10th percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile and 75th percentile and Table 11 shows
@FDI=@Risk evaluated at these four values of Aid. Note that @FDI=@Risk decreases
as Aid increases. Furthermore, @FDI=@Risk loses signi￿cance at higher values of Aid.
This suggests that aid mitigates the adverse impact of risk on FDI, and that at some
point aid neutralizes the e⁄ect of risk. The results also suggest that the risk-mitigating
e⁄ect of aid is more pronounced for the 3SLS regressions than the GMM regressions. For
example for the SSA sample, @FDI=@Risk is not signi￿cant at the 50th percentile of Aid
(Table 11), i.e., when Aggregate Aid = 12:055; Bilateral Aid = 7:121; and Multilateral
26Woodridge (2002, p.237) notes that in simultaneous equation models that have interactions among en-
dogenous and exogenous variables, ￿identi￿cation and choice of instruments are too abstract to be useful.￿
He suggests using some squares and cross products of the exogenous variables as additional instruments.
However, he also points out that in practice, it is di¢ cult to know which additional functions should
be added to the instrument list, and that one has to be cautious about the danger of using too many
instruments in their estimations.
20Aid = 4:586 (Table 10). This contrasts with the GMM estimations where @FDI=@Risk
remains negative and signi￿cant at the one percent level at higher values of aid, as high as
the 75th percentile (Table 7), i.e., when Aggregate Aid = 15:260; Bilateral Aid = 9:737;
and Multilateral Aid = 6:248 (Tables 6). Table 12 shows Aid￿ and Aid and the number
of countries whose average Aid exceed the critical value, i.e., Aid > Aid￿. Note that
Aid￿ is quite high. However, the Aid￿ for the 3SLS is lower than the Aid￿ for the GMM
regressions (compare Tables 8 and 12). Also, for about 5-7 countries (i.e., 15-20 percent
of the countries) in the sample, Aid > Aid￿ for the 3SLS estimations. In contrast, for the
GMM estimations, there is only one country, Guinea Bissau, for which Aid > Aid￿. This
again shows that the risk-mitigating e⁄ect of aid on FDI is greater for the 3SLS regressions
than the GMM regressions. In summary, the results from the 3SLS and GMM estimation
procedures lead to the conclusion that although aid mitigates the adverse e⁄ect of risk on
FDI, the amount of aid required to completely eliminate this adverse e⁄ect is quite high.
We now turn our attention to the Aid equation (Panel B of Table 9). With the
exception of in￿ ation, the signs as well as the level of signi￿cance of the control variables
are consistent across the two sample groups and the three measures of aid. All else
equal, poorer countries and countries with a large debt burden will receive more aid.
Also, similar to Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Chauvet and MesplØ-Somps (2006), we
￿nd that on average, small countries receive more aid per capita.27 We also ￿nd that
the e⁄ect of in￿ ation di⁄ers by the type of aid. Speci￿cally, in￿ ation is not signi￿cant
for bilateral aid but is signi￿cant at the one percent level for multilateral aid. For the
estimations using multilateral aid, the estimated coe¢ cient of in￿ ation is positive and the
estimated coe¢ cient of the square of in￿ ation is negative, suggesting that in￿ ation has a
positive but diminishing e⁄ect on multilateral aid.28 Thus, our results suggest that the
27Indeed, this result is not surprising and can be easily gleaned from our data. For example, for the SSA
sample, aid per capita averaged over the period 2000-2004 is about $72 for countries with populations less
than 3:5 million, and about $35 for countries whose populations exceed 3:5 million.
28One may interpret the positive association between in￿ ation and multilateral aid as evidence that
multilateral aid goes to countries that implement bad policies. Indeed one of the reasons cited for the
ine⁄ectiveness of aid to promote growth is that aid goes to countries that have a bad policy environment
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000). We take a di⁄erent view in that in￿ ation may be caused by exogenous factors
such as an increase in the price of imports, and not necessarily by policies enacted by government.
21objectives of multilateral and bilateral donors converge on some issues (e.g., the need to
help poorer countries or heavily indebted countries); but diverges on other issues (e.g.,
helping countries that are experiencing macroeconomic instability).
5 Conclusion
This paper has theoretically and empirically examined the link between FDI, foreign aid
and expropriation risk. We ￿nd that risk has a negative e⁄ect on FDI, aid mitigates the
adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI, and that both bilateral and multilateral aid are roughly
equivalent at achieving these results. We also ￿nd that the amount of aid required to
completely eliminate the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI is implausibly high.
With regard to policy, our results suggest that increasing aid will be bene￿cial to high
risk countries. This recommendation is particularly relevant for countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa, since the region is perceived to be very risky. However, we ￿nd that realistically,
aid cannot completely o⁄set the adverse e⁄ect of risk, suggesting that there is a limit to
which external assistance, in particular aid, can be helpful. This suggests that countries,
even if they receive aid, still need to take measures to reduce the types of risk that deter
FDI, such as the lack enforcement of rules and regulations. A note of caution is that one
has to be careful about using aid as a tool to mitigate the e⁄ect of country risk on foreign
investment. The reason is that aid may mask the actual e⁄ect of risk and therefore reduce
incentives for countries to improve their risk pro￿le. Thus, our results make a case for
sequential aid-conditionality, where aid is disbursed only after the recipient country has
enacted structural reform to reduce the types of risk that deter FDI.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to theoretically and empirically
analyze the link between FDI, aid and country risk. Indeed, the simple structure of the
model provides a useful framework for additional theoretical and empirical analysis. For
example, the model may be extended to allow the recipient country to engage in production
using a domestic technology. Here, one can analyze and compare the e⁄ectiveness of
various types of aid in ameliorating the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI. For example, one may
22compare technical assistance aid with budget-support aid. Technical assistance aid may
increase the e¢ ciency of the domestic production technology.29 In contrast, aid that comes
in the form of budget support augments the country￿ s domestic capital for production and
may not increase productivity. The model can also be easily amended to analyze the link
between default risk, foreign aid and indirect foreign investment (e.g., sovereign lending or
portfolio investment). Clearly, such an analysis will be more relevant for middle-income
countries and emerging economies (recall that this paper focuses on FDI and low-income
countries). Here, it will be interesting to examine whether aid mitigates the adverse e⁄ect
of default risk on indirect foreign investment. Another interesting exercise will be to
establish a ￿target level of risk￿and also ￿nd the level of aid that would drive risk to this
non-zero, but ￿acceptable￿ , target.
29Technical assistance is intended to ￿nance the transfer of technical and managerial skills for the purpose
of building national capacity. See Haque and Khan (1997) for a model where technical assistance is modeled
as expatriate skills that contribute to the productivity of local production.
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27Appendix A: Proof of Results.
Result (i): The threat of expropriation leads to under-investment ￿ i.e., the optimal
level of investment is constrained, kc < ku.
Proof. First note that in both the constrained and unconstrained cases, the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t maximizing condition is satis￿ed:
(1 ￿ ￿u)f0 (ku) = r; (10)
(1 ￿ ￿c)f0 (kc) = r: (11)
Given that f00 (k) < 0, it su¢ ces to show that ￿c > ￿u. De￿ne

























> 0 for ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿:
Now, g (￿c) = 0 implies ￿c < 1￿￿ . Results follow from the fact that g (:) is increasing in
￿. Q:E:D:
Result (ii): The risk of expropriation has an adverse e⁄ect on FDI ￿ i.e., dkc
dR < 0.
Proof. The chain rule implies dkc
dR = dkc
dA=dR
dA. Recall that the risk of expropriation can



















dA; we ￿rst need to calculate dkc
d￿c and d￿c
dA . We obtain dkc
d￿c < 0, by di⁄erentiating
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximizing condition (11) with respect to ￿, and we obtain d￿c
dA < 0, by



























30Note that neither ku nor ￿u depends on the amount of Aid, A.
28Therefore the expropriation risk has an adverse e⁄ect on FDI. Q:E:D:
Result (iii): Under certain conditions, aid mitigates the adverse e⁄ect of expropriation



























M = f (kc)









> 0. If f000 (kc) > 0, we cannot determine
the sign of M without a speci￿c functional form of the production function. For simplicity,
























> 0 implies that an increase in A reduces the magnitude of
dkc
dR and therefore aid mitigates the adverse e⁄ect of risk on FDI.
Appendix B: Joint Determination of FDI and Aid.
The maximization problem of the ￿rm and poor country remain the same as in Section
2. The poor country takes the amount of aid, A, as given and chooses the output share, ￿,
optimally and the ￿rm takes ￿ as given and chooses the level of FDI, k, optimally. Instead
of A being exogenous, we assume that the donor is motivated by altruism and cares about
the amount of FDI and the amount of aid that ￿ ows to the poor country. Let U be the
utility function of the donor and assume U1; U2 > 0; U12 = U21 > 0; and U11; U22 < 0;
where U1 and U2 are the ￿rst order derivative of U with respect to k and A, respectively,
and Uij is the ij-th second order derivative. Let q (A) be the cost of disbursing aid and
assume that q0 > 0 and q00 ￿ 0. Finally, let ￿ 2 (0;1) be the discount factor of the donor.




fU [f (k);A] ￿ q (A)g:
The optimal A satis￿es the ￿rst order condition:
U2 [f (k);A] = q0 (A) (14)
Clearly the optimal aid depends on k, denoted by A(k). Combining the optimal FDI,
k(￿(A)), with the optimal aid, A(k), allows for a joint determination of FDI and aid. Let
29Au be the unconstrained optimal aid and Ac be the constrained optimal aid. Then Au and
Ac satisfy (14) when k = ku and k = kc, respectively. We now derive the three results.
Note that the ￿rm￿ s and the poor country￿ s problems are unchanged and therefore Result











For Result (ii) and (iii), we need to show that dkc
dR < 0 and
d(dkc=dR)
dAc > 0, respectively.
Since A is endogenous, we achieve this by examining how changes in the discount factor,
￿, which is an exogenous parameter, a⁄ects R, kc and Ac. Here, we draw from Asiedu and
Villamil (2000) and Yaari (1965), who model the discount factor a decreasing function of
a country-speci￿c risk factor that re￿ ects the probability that a country will default on a













Our calculations show that it is di¢ cult to determine the sign of dkc
dR without assuming a
functional form for U(:), q(:) and f(:). Thus, for simplicity we assume U = [f (k)]
￿ A1￿￿,








￿[f (kc) + Ac](1 ￿ ￿)
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￿[f (kc) + Ac](1 ￿ ￿)



















Thus when ￿ > ￿
2￿￿,
d(dkc=dR)




dAc=d￿ > 0 and therefore Result
(iii) follows.
31Speci￿cally, ￿ is de￿ned as ￿ = ￿￿, where ￿ denotes an idiosyncratic factor that re￿ ects the ￿patience￿
of decision makers in the poor country, and ￿ = 1=r is the common pure discount factor. As ￿ falls, the
￿country speci￿c￿ ￿ falls, indicating that the country becomes more myopic, and thereby increases the
likelihood of a default.
30Table 1 
List of Countries  
Countries  in Sub-
Saharan African 
Risk Aggregate  Aid/GDP  (%)  Bilateral  Aid/GDP (%)  Multilateral Aid/GDP (%) 
Botswana*  4.231 3.663  2.788  0.874 
Burkina Faso  6.809 13.873  8.767  5.106 
Cameroon  6.720 4.601  3.342  1.259 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  9.250 14.753  11.490  3.263 
Congo, Rep.  7.668 5.573  4.627  0.946 
Cote d'Ivoire  6.753 5.115  3.523  1.592 
Ethiopia  8.486 12.988  6.845  6.144 
Gabon  6.528 1.715  1.452  0.263 
Gambia, The  6.165 21.864  10.677  11.187 
Ghana  6.731 9.197  4.826  4.372 
Guinea  6.839 9.403  4.705  4.698 
Guinea–Bissau  7.123 48.769  29.334  19.435 
Kenya  6.267 7.219  4.791  2.428 
Madagascar  6.976 10.479  5.946  4.533 
Malawi  6.210 22.469  11.239  11.230 
Mali  7.479 17.795  11.226  6.569 
Mozambique  7.550 31.281  22.233  9.048 
Niger  7.655 15.091  9.426  5.665 
Nigeria  7.677 0.574  0.313  0.261 
Senegal  6.208 11.639  8.090  3.549 
Sierra Leone  9.182 20.701  11.685  9.016 
South Africa*  4.257 0.360  0.277  0.083 
Sudan  8.363 4.298  2.939  1.360 
Tanzania  6.174 16.780  11.201  5.579 
Togo  6.849 9.945  6.092  3.853 
Uganda  6.576 11.760  6.060  5.700 
Zambia  6.873 18.825  11.592  7.233 
Zimbabwe  8.438 3.910  3.056  0.853 
Countries  outside 
Sub-Saharan 
African 
      
Bangladesh  7.826 4.479  2.471  2.008 
Haiti  9.800 8.734  6.263  2.471 
India  6.611 0.548  0.272  0.276 
Mongolia  6.163 20.670  13.769  6.901 
Nicaragua  8.302 17.035  12.274  4.761 
Pakistan  7.939 2.256  1.072  1.184 
Papua New Guinea  7.165 9.241  8.070  1.171 
Vietnam  7.098 3.375  2.186  1.189 
Yemen, Rep.  5.500 4.406  2.547  1.859 
 
Notes: * refers to countries in Sub–Saharan Africa that are not low–income. The data are averages over the period 
1983–2004. Risk ranges from 0–12, a higher number implies more risk. Aggregate aid is the sum of bilateral and 
multilateral aid. 
  31Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Low-Income Sub-Saharan  Africa  Variable 
Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
FDI/GDP  (%)  1.536 2.254 1.432 2.179 
Risk  7.414 1.763 7.049 1.856 
ln (1+Phones per 1000 Population)  1.920  0.789  1.890  0.874 
GDP Growth (%)  2.832  3.389  2.750  3.436 
Trade/GDP  (%)  59.168 29.348 59.938 25.652 
Inflation  (%)  16.651 19.162 17.891 20.312 
ln (GDP per capita)  5.784 0.573 5.640 0.559 
Public and publicly guaranteed debt service (% of exports)  16.026 8.751 16.865 8.799 
ln (Population)  9.447 1.549 9.277 1.051 
Aggregate  Aid/GDP  (%)  12.340 11.356 12.602 12.003 
Bilateral Aid/GDP (%)  7.759  7.509  7.773  7.798 




The (Direct) Effect of Risk on FDI: Difference GMM Regressions 
 













































            


































































0.8205 0.7755  0.8117  0.1665  0.1716  0.1837 
Number of 
Observations 
154 154  157  125  125  128 
Number of 
Countries 
35 35  35  28  28  28 
  32Table 4 
Effect of Risk and Aid on FDI: Difference GMM Estimations 
Low-Income Sub-Saharan  Africa   
























































Control Variables            






























































Sargan Test (p–value)  0.5171  0.5478  0.8208  0.7425  0.7563  0.6421 
2
nd Order aucorrelation 
(P–value) 
0.7879 0.7459  0.7859  0.1680  0.2051  0.1720 
Number of 
Observations 
154 154  157  125  125  128 
Number of Countries  35  35  35  28  28  28 
 
Notes: * denotes significant at 10%; **significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. P values are in 
parentheses. Aggregate aid is the sum of bilateral and multilateral aid.
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Table 5 
Effect of Aid and Risk on FDI: System GMM Estimations 
 
Low–Income Countries  Sub–Saharan Africa   





































Notes: * denotes significant at 10%; **significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. P values are in 





Values of Aid at 25
th, 50
th and 75
th Percentile for Sample Groups 



















Aggregate Aid  4.293  9.874  16.052  4.019  10.109  15.260 
Bilateral  Aid 2.801  5.803  10.076  2.797 5.697 9.737 
Multilateral Aid  1.355  3.299  6.041  1.213 3.787 6.248 
 
Notes: * denotes significant at 10%; **significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. P values are in 
parentheses. Aggregate aid is the sum of bilateral and multilateral aid. 
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Table 7 
Effect of a one–unit change in RISK on FDI (i.e., Aid RISK
FDI * ˆ ˆ β α + = ∂




th Percentile of Aid. 
 
 
Panel A: Difference GMM Estimations 
 
























































Panel B: System GMM Estimations 
 
























































Notes: * denotes significant at 10%; **significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. P values are in 
parentheses. Aggregate aid is the sum of bilateral and multilateral aid. 
 
Table 8 
The Critical Values of Aid,   and the (actual) values of Aid averaged from 1983-2004, 
* Aid Aid . 
Low–Income Countries  Sub–Saharan Africa  Type of Aid 
Average  
Aid,  Aid  
* Aid , 
Difference-
GMM 
* Aid , 
System-
GMM 
Average  Aid, 
Aid  
* Aid , 
Difference-
GMM 
* Aid , 
System-
GMM 
Aggregate Aid  12.340 
 
32.2 56.833  12.602  28.421 34.929 
Bilateral Aid  7.759 
 
22.0 50.833  7.773  17.267 21.546 
Multilateral Aid  4.581 
 
11.842 23.923 4.829  13.294 16.148 
 
Notes: The critical value of aid,  , is the amount of aid that completely neutralizes the adverse risk 





FDI .  
  35Table 9 
Joint Estimation of FDI and Aid: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
 
Panel A: Estimates for FDI Equation 
Low-Income Sub-Saharan  Africa  Variables 





































Control Variables             




























































Observations 134  134  139  99  99  102 
No of Countries  33  33  33  23  23  23 
R-squared 0.337  0.318  0.348 0.325  0.289 0.357 
            
Panel B: Estimates for Aid Equation 
Low-Income Sub-Saharan  Africa  Variables 













Control Variables             








































































Observations 134  134  139  99  99  102 
No of Countries  33  33  33  23  23  23 
R-squared 0.537  0.447  0.587 0.565  0.438 0.661 
 
Notes: * denotes significant at 10%; **significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. P values are in 
parentheses. Aggregate aid is the sum of bilateral and multilateral aid. 
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Table 10 



















































































Notes: The values of aid are different from that of Table 5 because the sample sizes are different. Data 
for some of the variables included in the Aid equation was not available for a few countries. 
 
 
Table 11  
 Effect of a one–unit change in RISK on FDI (i.e., Aid RISK
FDI * ˆ ˆ β α + = ∂





th Percentile of Aid. 



















































































Notes: * denotes significant at 10%; **significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. P values are in 




The Critical Values of Aid,   and the (actual) values of Aid averaged from 1983-2004, 
* Aid Aid . 
  Low–Income Countries  Sub–Saharan Africa 
 Average   
Aid,  Aid  
Critical values of 






Aid >  
* Aid
Average  Aid, 
Aid  




Aid >  
* Aid




7 (21 %)  14.041  19.850  5 (21%) 




















Notes: The critical value of aid,  , is the amount of aid that completely neutralizes the adverse risk 
of FDI. Thus, it is the value of Aid at which 
* Aid
Aid RISK
FDI * ˆ ˆ β α + = ∂
∂ =0.  
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